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Abstract
The South African Renewable Energy Independent
Power Producer Procurement Programme (REIPPPP)
is a competitive tender process that was launched to
facilitate private sector investment into grid-con-
nected renewable energy (RE) generation. It has
been an undisputed success in terms of capacity,
investment and price outcomes. Since 2011 a total
of 6 328 Megawatts of wind, solar photovoltaic and
other RE generation capacity has been procured,
amounting to USD 20.5 billion in investment. Bid
tariffs have fallen sharply over the course of the pro-
gramme and the most recently awarded projects are
amongst the lowest priced grid-connected RE pro-
jects in the world. Considering South Africa’s suc-
cess in achieving more investment via independent
power producers in four years than in the rest of
Sub-Saharan Africa over the past 25, the
REIPPPP’s design and management is likely to be
of interest to policymakers in African (and other
developing) countries. This paper provides a com-
prehensive review of the programme’s tender docu-
mentation, implementation, and outcomes to date.
Together with supporting research, this analysis has
been used to develop a set of high-level lessons
intended to facilitate the roll out of similar RE IPP
competitive tender programmes in other emerging
markets. 
Keywords: South Africa; renewable energy; com-
petitive tender; independent power producers
Highlights
• Provides a comprehensive review of South
Africa’s Renewable Energy IPP Procurement
Programme and its outcomes. 
• Focuses on the tender documentation in partic-
ular, to assess key design features. 
• Combines this analysis with supporting research
to identify the success factors.
• Lends support to growing international evi-
dence that competitive tenders produce better
outcomes than other renewable energy procure-
ment policy instruments.
• Develops a set of lessons from the South African
experience that may be transferable to other
developing nations.
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1. Introduction
High-level energy policy objec-
tives generally do not differ
much between countries. Most seek an adequate
and reliable electricity supply that is competitively
priced, progressively available to all, fosters socio-
economic development and is environmentally sus-
tainable. The cost of renewable energy (RE) is
falling and is increasingly able to meet these policy
objectives. Globally, innovation and competition
have driven down costs, and solar photovoltaic
(PV) and wind energy are now amongst the cheap-
est electricity sources in many countries, including
South Africa (Bischof-Niemz, 2015; Randall, 2015;
Shah & Booream-Phelps, 2015).
The majority of RE projects in Africa have been
procured through unsolicited, directly negotiated
projects. However, in Africa and elsewhere there is
compelling evidence that competitive tenders or
auctions provide superior price outcomes. In con-
trast, directly negotiated projects have tended to be
more expensive, and the other common alternative
policy instrument, RE feed-in tariff (REFIT)
schemes, have yielded very few African projects
(Eberhard et al., 2016).Arguments against compet-
itive tenders – that they are too complicated, have
high transaction costs and take too long versus
direct negotiations or REFITs – can mostly be coun-
tered by experience. Competitive tenders can deliv-
er a pipeline of bankable projects within a reason-
able time, especially when they incorporate stan-
dardised power purchase agreements (PPAs) and
appropriate credit enhancement and security mea-
sures. Also, any resources devoted to designing and
running these tenders are easily justified in the
lower bid tariffs obtained (Eberhard et al., 2016). 
South Africa provides a striking example of the
success of a well designed RE competitive tender.
The Renewable Energy Independent Power
Producer Procurement Programme (REIPPPP) was
launched to facilitate private sector investment into
grid-connected RE generation in South Africa. IPPs
were invited to submit bids for onshore wind, solar
PV, concentrated solar power (CSP), small hydro,
biomass, biogas or landfill gas projects. Between
2011 and 2015 four such rounds of competitive
bidding, referred to as bid windows (BWs), have
been completed. Competition has been fierce, with
over 300 submissions1 from BWs 1 to 4 resulting in
just under a third (92) of these – mostly wind and
solar PV – being selected for the procurement of
6 328 megawatts (MW), amounting to a total
investment of USD 20.5 billion. No other govern-
ment-initiated programme in South Africa rivals the
scale of investment achieved, or the degree of trans-
parency (Eberhard, 2016). Submissions for an
expedited bid window, designed primarily to pro-
vide bid projects that had been unsuccessful during
prior rounds with a second opportunity to bid, were
made in November 2015. Under this BW, 1 800
MW was made available for tender; however, pro-
jects will only be awarded later in 2016 and so it is
excluded from this review. 
As a result of fierce competition, prices have fall-
en sharply between BWs 1 and 4. Projects awarded
under BW 4 indicate that both solar PV and wind
energy are now cheaper than the national utility,
Eskom’s, average cost of supply2and about half the
cost of its new power stations (Eberhard, 2016). In
2015, they were also amongst the lowest-priced
grid-connected RE projects in the world, reaching
as low as ZARc 77 (USDc 6.4) per kWh and ZARc
56 (USDc 4.7) per kWh, respectively.3Indications
are that the expedited BW in 2016 will deliver even
lower prices.
By October 2015, 42 of the 92 contracted pro-
jects (equivalent to approximately one third of total
contracted capacity to date) were fully
operational,4 demonstrating both the ability of a
competitive tender to expedite the delivery of
numerous projects, as well as the shorter time
frames associated with constructing RE generation
plants versus conventional fossil fuels. In less than 4
years, South Africa achieved more investment in
IPPs than in the rest of sub-Saharan Africa over the
past 25 years (Eberhard et al, 2016), and
Bloomberg New Energy Finance ranked South
Africa amongst the top ten countries in the world in
terms of RE investment. Given South Africa’s global
significance in the RE industry, this paper provides
a comprehensive review of the REIPPPP and its
outcomes. Existing literature on the programme has
primarily addressed BWs 1 to 3. This paper pro-
vides an updated overview of the REIPPPP in
Section 1, its bid documentation in Section 2 and
the outcomes to date in Section 3. An in-depth
analysis of the tender documentation was consid-
ered key to identifying design features that have
underpinned the REIPPPP’s success. It is therefore
the focus of this review. Lastly, Section 4 extracts
the lessons learned from the South African experi-
ence and discusses their policy implications. The
authors arrived at these lessons in two ways: firstly
through a literature review, which collated and
refined lessons that had been identified in other
reports and studies; and, secondly, through an
1 Excluding those under the Expedited Bid Window.
2 Eskom’s electricity revenue per kWh is given as
ZARc 76 for 2015/16 in the Eskom Integrated
Report 2016 (Eskom, 2016).
3 Based on a ZAR:USD exchange rate of 12:1, as sup-
plied by the Department of Energy IPP Office. 
4 Based on the EnergyBlog Project Database:
http://energy.org.za/knowledge-tools/project-data-
base.
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inductive, ground-up process where emerging
lessons were identified through interviews as well as
the aforementioned detailed analysis of the
REIPPPP documentation. The authors believe that
these lessons are particularly important for sub-
Saharan Africa, where the primary barrier to imple-
menting RE remains institutional (Eberhard et al,
2016). Governments need to build on best interna-
tional practices in running competitive tenders for
new power generation capacity, including renew-
able energy technologies. There is currently a strong
interest from international developers in Africa, and
using insights from the REIPPPP could expedite the
roll out of RE IPP competitive tenders in these, and
other, developing countries. 
2. Background
From 2011 to 2015 the number of countries with
RE competitive tenders or auctions has increased
substantially, from 36 to at least 60. In contrast,
REFIT policy instruments have seen slowed growth
from 70 to only 79 over the same period, indicating
a shift towards tenders as the preferred policy
instrument (REN21, 2015). This is not surprising
when one looks at the price outcomes of some of
the most recent RE competitive tenders across the
globe. In respect of wind tariffs being achieved,
front-runners include Morocco, Mexico, Peru, South
Africa, Australia and Brazil. While the 2015 wind
prices for South Africa, Brazil and Australia aver-
aged USDc5.6 per kWh (ACT Government, 2016;
Marais, 2015; Santos, 2015; Spattuza, 2015)5, the
wind prices for 2016 tenders to date – Mexico, Peru
and Morocco – bettered this byaveragingas little as
USDc 5.5, USDc 3.7 and USDc 3.0 per kWh,
respectively (Hristova, 2016; Spattuza, 2016;
Yaneva, 2016).
Solar PV has seen an even greater number of
competitive tenders or auctions in 2015 and 2016.6
In May 2016, Dubai set a new world record for solar
PV prices at USDc 3 per kWh (Tsanova, 2016).
Mexico’s inaugural power auction and the United
States have also achieved solar PV bid tariffs at and
below USDc 4 per kWh,7 respectively (Ayre, 2016;
Dezem and Williams, 2016). On the African conti-
nent, the Scaling Solar auction in Zambia delivered
a winning tariff of USDc 6 per kWh (Shumkov,
2016). While bid tariffs across countries will not be
directly comparable (due to different economics,
resource quality, concessional finance and incen-
tives such as tax breaks), South Africa’s most recent
solar PV prices are still comfortably amongst the top
ten in the world.
With so many countries showing strong progress
in terms of RE IPP competitive tenders, why is the
South African case significant? Firstly, because not
only have its price outcomes been world class, but
its clean record to date – of the 92 projects award-
ed, none have failed to date – indicates that valu-
able lessons may be learned. This is both in terms
of the requirements imposed on bidders in the ten-
der documentation and legal contracts, as well as
the management of the procurement programme
and bidders. In many ways, the REIPPPP was also
a pioneer. Government was willing to assume the
risk of trying new design options, rather than simply
replicating international frameworks that may not
necessarily have suited the country’s unique
requirements. For example, in international RE ten-
ders governments had typically chosen the sites,
borne the cost of connection and generally
assumed more of the risk. This would have placed
unacceptable pressure on the South African govern-
ment and the decision was made to transfer some
of these responsibilities to the bidders. Lastly, it is
likely that socio-economic development is a key
objective for any developing country. The South
African programme included a wide range of non-
price criteria and provides excellent insight into how
a competitive tender can be designed to boost
socio-economic development while still procuring
generation capacity at a competitive price. 
3. Results and discussion 
3.1.An overview of the REIPPPP
The REIPPPP was designed as a series of single,
closed-bid (also known as sealed) tenders, initiated
by the issue of a combined request for qualification
and proposal (RFP). Each bid window made avail-
able a total amount of MW in specific technology
categories (Table 4). Unlike many international RE
competitive tenders, the REIPPPP did not include a
prequalification stage. Instead, it was structured as a
one-stage tender, in which all compliant bid
responses submitted by the prescribed deadline –
typically only three months from the issue of the
RFP – were accepted. Preferred bidder status was
awarded to the highest ranked projects per RET cat-
egory, within the technology-specific and total MW
allocation. The lack of a prequalification stage was
compensated for by incorporating stringent RFP
requirements and non-negotiable contracts. This
ensured that bidders were serious and adequately
resourced to complete their projects as proposed.
While this has been successful thus far, it imposed a
significant transaction cost on bidders, many of
whom absorbed these costs without being awarded
any projects.
Once IPPs were appointed as preferred bidders
5 The South African bid tariff calculations were based
on project data from the DOE IPP Office. Where
necessary, to convert bid tariffs to USD, an
AUD:USD exchange rate of 1.33:1 and BRL:USD of
3.33:1 was used. 
6 17 completed auctions in 2015; 14 completed auc-
tions so far in 2016. 
7 These were boosted by in-country incentives.
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they were required to sign standardised, non-nego-
tiable, South African Rand (ZAR)-denominated, 20
year PPAs with the off-taker, Eskom. Prices were
indexed to inflation, based on the South African
Consumer Price Index. The PPA was supported by
an implementation agreement (IA) between the IPP
and government (represented by the Department of
Energy), which, along with a government frame-
work support agreement, effectively ‘guarantees’
Eskom’s payments. There was also a standard
direct agreement (DA) between the IPP, Eskom, the
Department of Energy (DOE) and lenders, which
provides the latter with step-in rights in the event of
default. Lastly, connection agreements were
required, although the specific agreement depend-
ed on whether connection would be to the trans-
mission or distribution system. In general, IPPs were
responsible for the costs of shallow connections (i.e.
to the nearest substation), but not for deep connec-
tion costs (i.e. those related to strengthening
Eskom’s transmission system).
Historically Eskom was responsible for IPP pro-
curement efforts in South Africa but made little
progress. When the DOE took over this role, it had
little institutional capacity to run a programme of
the size and complexity envisaged for the REIPPPP
and approached the National Treasury’s Public
Private Partnership (PPP) Unit for assistance
(Eberhard et al., 2014). A small number of technical
staff from the Unit and the DOE established a com-
bined team known as the DOE IPP office with full
authority to run the programme. The DOEIPP
office team leader, seconded from the PPP Unit,
had extensive experience working with the private
sector, managing consultants and working with PPP
contracts (Eberhard et al., 2014). The largely ad
hoc institutional status of this unit, acting at arm’s
length from government as a dedicated project
office, allowed for a flexible operating approach
that emphasised problem-solving to make the pro
gramme successful, rather than automatically fol-
lowing governmental operational policies that
emphasise enforcement of rules. 
The DOE IPP unit was given only nine months
to prepare all the bid documentation and associated
legal contracts before the launch of the REIPPPP.
This was a formidable task considering that South
Africa had no experience in running RE competitive
tenders. To achieve this, the Development Bank of
Southern Africa (DBSA)
provided a sizable ZAR 80million for the DOE IPP
unit to hire transaction advisors, a project office and
facilitate capacity building. National Treasury later
offered ZAR 100million, which was used to repay
the DBSA and saw the REIPPPP through BW 1 and
into part of BW 2(Martin &Winkler, 2014). The
DOEIPP office tendered for a large suite of finan-
cial, legal and technical transaction advisors, many
of whom were from abroad and had international
experience. In the initial design stages there were
over 50 advisors around the table, whose expertise
and knowledge of international best practices has
been fundamental to the REIPPPP’s success. Over
time, the number of advisors to the DOE extended
to over 100 representatives from 13 professional
firms offering legal, financial, technical, socio-eco-
nomic and environmental consultancy services.
External professional firms were used to conduct
bid evaluations so that the selection process would
be strictly independent from government and offer
objectivity. Bidders have widely acknowledged this
as an important contributor to their participation in
the programme. 
3.2 General and qualification requirements
Bid evaluation took place in two stages. First, bid
submissions were assessed to determine whether
they were ‘compliant bids’, meaning that they met
both general requirements and numerous pre-
scribed thresholds to ‘qualify’ for the second stage.
The latter stage was a comparative evaluation of all
compliant bids based on price (constituting 70% of
the final score) and a basket of economic develop-
ment criteria (30%). The DOE prescribed price caps
per technology, which fully indexed bid tariffs could
not exceed. These caps were adjusted over time
based on local and global influencing factors, and
Table 1 compares them to changes in the average
tariffs of preferred bidders. The DOE also placed
maximum limits on the total capacity available for
tender per technology (which differs each bid
round); however it reserved the right to reallocate
the total MW available amongst the various tech-
nologies at any stage. In BW 4 this was extended to
permit the DOE to increase or decrease the total
MW available per technology and/or for the bid
round in total, with the latter increase being capped
at double the total initial allocation. In addition,
there were restrictions on bid capacity per project
(Table 2), which allowed for a greater number of
project awards within each RET’s allocation and
thereby stimulates competition. 
Due to the significant strain that the REIPPPP
imposed on already limited local advisory capacity,
bidders could not be prohibited from consulting
with the advisory firms (e.g. lawyers, auditors etc.)
as well. However, to manage potential conflict of
interests, both the bidder and advisory firm were
required toput proper ring-fencing mechanisms in
place and provide assurance to this effect in the bid
response. 
A recurring criticism of international RE IPP
competitive tenders has been the award of contracts
to inexperienced bidders, who subsequently strug-
gle to finance and deliver on their project as pro-
posed. The inclusion of high penalty costs reduces
this risk by ensuring that bids are as fail-safe as pos-
sible (Papapetrou, 2014). In line with this, the
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REIPPPP required bidders to provide an uncondi-
tional, irrevocable Bid Guarantee of ZAR 100 000
per MW of contracted capacity for the proposed
project. Once provisionally informed of its preferred
bidder status, each IPP had to lodge a new ‘pre-
ferred bidder’ guarantee for double the amount
(ZAR 200 000) per MW. Only thereafter would it
officially be appointed as a preferred bidder, and
this guarantee could be forfeited to the DOE if the
preferred bidder failed to comply with various pre-
scribed conditions. Upon signing the IA, preferred
bidders were required to pay a development fee
equal to 1% of their total project cost to the DOE’s
Project Development Fund. This proved valuable
for the programme’s sustainability, by securing
funding for transaction advisors and running future
tenders, thereby largely keeping the programme off
government’s budget. 
All monetary amounts in the bid response had
to be presented in South African rands. Adjust-
ments were permitted to the prescribed spot rate
used at bid submission – and corresponding adjust-
ments to bid tariff – at financial close in respect of
capital expenditures (capex), but not for operating
costs. From BW 3 the foreign exchange exposure
that the DOE would compensate for between bid
submission and financial close was limited to 60%
of capex, to align with the 40% local content
requirement (which will be discussed in Section
3.3.2.). As per economic theory, operating cost for-
eign exchange movements should be compensated
for via the inflation-linked tariff. Other important
general requirements included the interface with the
grid provider, obtaining information on grid capac-
ity and potential constraints, and clearly defining
which part of the shallow connection works would
be undertaken, owned and operated by the IPP
(rather than the grid provider). 
In broad terms, projects that ‘qualified’ for com-
parative evaluation were those that were technical-
ly, financially and legally qualified, as well as having
sufficient experience, commitment and resources to
execute the project as submitted – to be discussed
below.
3.2.1 Legal criteria and evaluation 
As of BW 4, the legal qualification criterion consist-
ed of only two sub-criteria. The first required that
the Project Company’s Constitutional Documents
reflect that it is a special purpose vehicle whose sole
purpose is to undertake the bidder’s project, and
that it is ‘ring-fenced’ in terms of the South African
Companies Act. It was not necessary for this special
purpose vehicle to be established by bid submis-
sion, but an undertaking was required that it would
be. Secondly, various written confirmations of
under-takings were required. Amongst others, all
bidder companies, their members and lenders had
to accept the terms of the PPA, IA, DA and connec-
tion agreements and adhere to the requirement that
no mark-ups or amendments are permitted. Several
other sub-criteria were removed over the course of
the REIPPPP as the DOE acquired comfort with the
programme and the bidders. This demonstrates the
flexibility that a multiple bid window tender offers,
as well as the importance of refining the design to
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Table 2: Contracted capacity permitted per
project (DOE, 2014).
Technology Minimum Maximum
Onshore wind 1 140




Landfill gas 1 20
Small hydro 1 40*
* The maximum limit was amended to 40 MW by the Minister
in the Second Determination (versus 10 MW prior to this).
Table 1: Price caps and average bid tariffs per technology and bid window (Authors’ calculations
from DOE IPP Office project data).





















Onshore wind 115 114 115 90 100 74 Removed 72 Removed 62
Solar PV 285 276 285 165 140 99 Removed 85 Removed 79
CSP 285 269 285 251 165 164 165 - 165 -
Biomass 107 - 107 - 140 140 140 - 148 145
Biogas 80 - 80 - 80 - -* - -* -
Landfill gas 60 - 84 - 94 94 94 - 99 -
Small hydro 103 - 103 85 85 - 106 - 112 112
* No biogas capacity was made available for tender under BW 4
reduce bidder burden as the programme progresses. 
3.2.2. Land acquisition and land use criteria and
evaluation
Bidders had to submit sufficient proof of land acqui-
sition, which could include title deeds or notarial
lease for the project site; an unconditional land
option, lease or sale of land agreement; or a con-
veyancer’s certificate (in instances where title deeds
were unavailable at the time of submission). A key
change to this criterion in BW 4 was that bidders
were no longer required to submit proof in the bid
response that all necessary applications (including
those relating to land use change, subdivision and
zoning applications, respectively) had been made to
secure the right to lawfully use the project site for
their intended purposes. They were now only
required to provide this after being appointed as a
preferred bidder, so that unsuccessful bidders
avoided incurring this cost and time burden.
3.2.3. Environmental consent criteria and
evaluation
Bidders had to pass both general and technology-
specific sub-criteria under this criterion, and had to
provide evidence that all requisite environmental
consents had been obtained by bid submission. The
primary requirement across all technologies was an
environmental authorisation per project, as
required by the South African National
Environmental Management Act. This was either in
the form of an Environmental Impact Assessment
Report (EIAR) or a lesser Basic Assessment Report
(BAR), dependent on the plant capacity or size of
the site. It was a significant cost item for bidders
(ZAR 2–6 million) and had the longest lead time of
all the permissions required, taking up to 24 months
(Mulcahy, 2014). Bidders also had to submit details
of objections to the facility’s development raised
during any public participation process as well as
appeals to any environmental consent required.
The bidder could fail this criterion where the rele-
vant appeal or review period had not expired by bid
submission. 
Water was another key consideration. South
Africa is a water-scarce country and it was crucial
that each bidder identified whether their project
(including construction activities) would require an
Integrated Water Use Licence under the National
Water Act. This included providing copies of all
studies done to determine the project’s water needs
and activities.8To reduce the burden on the
Department of Water Affairs, the licence itself was
only required before signing the PPA. However,
upon bid submission any bidder requiring a water
allocation had to provide written confirmation of
this approved allocation from the local water ser-
vices provider (usually the municipality) or, where
this was insufficient and a water use licence would
be required, provide a non-binding confirmation of
water availability from the Department. 
From BW 4, bidders were no longer required to
provide proof in their bid response of all non-core
environmental consents in respect of the proposed
facility being lawfully developed, constructed, con-
nected to a distribution/transmission system and
operated in accordance with the PPA. They still,
however, had to demonstrate that these other appli-
cations had been made upon being appointed as
preferred bidders. 
3.2.4. Financial criteria and evaluation
The financial qualification criteria broadly relate to
the bid price and related financial proposal. Four
key criteria, with numerous sub-criteria, were
assessed. While they were stringent, they have been
important drivers for ensuring that projects are
implemented on schedule and as proposed. Firstly,
bidders had to submit fully-indexed prices and par-
tially-indexed prices per MWh. As stated, the fully-
indexed prices had to be equal to or lower than the
price caps in order to pass this criterion. From BW
3, concentrated solar power (CSP) was recognised
as a technology with storage capabilities, and the
REIPPPP began to price CSP projects differently.
While other RE projects earn their flat bid tariff at all
times, CSP bidders submitted a ‘base price’ which
is then adjusted upwards or downwards according
to the time of day that the project’s energy is deliv-
ered. Premium payments, at 270% of the base price
during designated peak times, were designed to
incentivise CSP bidders to use their storage ability
to help meet peak demand on the national grid. 
Secondly, the project’s financial standing was
thoroughly analysed. The bidder had to propose
the funding it intended to use, the identity of all
providers or members, the value of the contribution
from each and the source of finance. Where corpo-
rate or equity financing would be used, the bidder
had to provide the audited financial statements for
the latest three financial years of the ultimate
provider entity. Additionally, the bidder had to
demonstrate that the net assets of each ultimate
provider over the past three years had been at least
100% of the finance they were proposing to put
towards the bid project (‘net asset test’), or that the
provider had a proven track record in the past five
years of raising finance to the equivalent of at least
100% of its proposal (‘track record test’). From BW
2 equity members with ‘free carry’ or ‘sweat equity’
i.e. no equity investment in the project, such as
8 ‘Water use’ includes numerous water-related activi-
ties, such as disposing of waste water and storing
water to serve the facility.
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black enterprises9 and local community trust enti-
ties, are exempt from these two tests. If this were not
the case it could have adversely affected the
achievement of some of the economic development
objectives in respect of black and local community
ownership.
The third sub-criterion considered the robust-
ness and deliverability of the funding proposal.
Bidders had to provide a breakdown of equity, cor-
porate finance and external debt and their uses
(capital expenditure and grid connection costs). A
defining feature of the REIPPPP was the require-
ment that letters of support must be provided by the
ultimate finance provider(s) of each funding source,
substantially in the form prescribed in the RFP. This
differed from most international competitive ten-
ders at the time, which had not required finance to
be locked in by bid submission. The letters of sup-
port required each financier to make a firm commit-
ment, pledge that it had conducted a due diligence
on the proposed project and confirmed the accura-
cy of the bidder’s documentation. This essentially
outsourced part of the due diligence to the banks
and other funders, ensuring that bidders could not
engage in ‘low-balling’ where they price unrealisti-
cally low to win contracts and subsequently cannot
deliver (Eberhard et al., 2014). It also reduced the
DOE’s due diligence load. In addition, funders had
to acknowledge that they accepted the risk alloca-
tion as embedded in the PPA, IA and DA, which is
a critical issue in PPPs. 
Bidders also had to demonstrate a ‘robust miti-
gation strategy’ – an alternative plan to obtain funds
if their proposed finance provider became unable to
do so. A letter of indicative support from the alter-
native funders was required. The robustness of the
financial models was also assessed. This criterion
required, amongst others, sensitivity analyses on the
bidders’ financial models to indicate the impact of
foreign exchange movements on the bid tariff; dis-
closures on tax and accounting treatments and
assumptions applied; as well as an audit review
opinion of the financial models by a suitable profes-
sional firm. Lastly, bidders had to submit a declara-
tion in respect of success payments, which are the
reimbursements of costs incurred in the develop-
ment of the bid project which will be payable only
on achievement of financial close. Examples includ-
ed payments to developers, free carry for equity
members and success payments for equity and non-
equity members (DOE, 2014a). 
3.2.5. Technical criteria and evaluation
Bidders had to complete a standardised technical
evaluation matrix as part of their bid response. This
criterion also contained numerous requirements
around grid connection, such as a signed letter stat-
ing that the project was able to comply with the
applicable grid codes prior to scheduled COD.
Bidders also included a cost estimate letter (CEL),
which provided an indicative timeline and cost of
the required connection works from the grid
provider. The onus was on bidders to apply in time
to receive this CEL by submission date. Where the
bidder intended to perform shallow connection
works on an own- or self-build basis, they had to
supply an itemised cost estimate for their part.
Upon the appointment of preferred bidders, this
CEL had to be replaced by obtaining a more up-to-
date and accurate budget quote from the grid
provider. Bidders had to clearly identify what their
interface with the grid provider would be during
operations.
There were also many technology-specific crite-
ria. In broad categories, these covered:
• eligible technology requirements: prescribed
standards and certifications that proved the
technology’s quality and performance;
• energy resource certainty (independently veri-
fied) for biomass and biogas projects which con-
firmed the availability of fuel to meet the facili-
ty’s demand for at least the first two years of
operation;
• forecast energy sales report (independently veri-
fied) based on the required production estimate,
conducted by a suitable energy resource asses-
sor;
• contracting company capability requirements;
and
• project schedule disclosures and a deadline by
which COD had tobe achieved.
The forecast energy sales report differed by tech-
nology and was an essential part of the technical
criteria, as it involved the collection of resource data
to estimate future energy sales. For wind projects,
for example, this report had to supply at least 365
consecutive days of wind data (subject to additional
criteria where there had been gaps in data collec-
tion) measured on the project site at specific heights
and in accordance with international standards for
wind testing. Solar PV projects required at least ten
years of solar data extracted from a prescribed
acceptable technology source.
9 A black enterprise is a legal entity with 50.1% or
more of its equity owned by black people and which
is controlled by black people, who are defined as
African, Indian and Coloured South African citizens
(Department of Energy, 2014b). The REIPPPP
included requirements around black ownership in
line with the South African government’s emphasis
on redressing the inequalities of the previous
apartheid government and bringing the glack major-
ity into the economic mainstream (SAInfo Reporter,
2013). 
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3.2.6. Economic development criteria and
evaluation
These economic development (ED) qualification
criteria must not be confused with the ED evalua-
tion criteria, the latter of which are only imposed in
the comparative evaluation stage. There were two
primary ED thresholds that had to be passed for a
bid to be compliant. Firstly, there had to be a mini-
mum of 40% ‘South African entity participation’ in
the project company. This was initially defined as
participation by those entities ‘based and registered
in the Republic of South Africa, which have legal
and beneficial participation in the Project
Company’ (DOE, 2011). From BW 3, however, the
definition was narrowed to participation by South
African citizens specifically. Secondly, the bidder
had to have a Broad-Based Black Economic
Empowerment contributor status level of at least
5,10 although this was only in respect of South
African bidder members. Lastly, bidders were
required to meet or exceed any minimum thresh-
olds indicated in the Economic Development
Scorecard provided by the DOE, and to provide
supporting documentation as proof. These thresh-
olds are provided in Table 3 (Section 3.3.2.), and
discussed in more detail, below. 
3.2.7. Value for money
This concept was introduced from BW 2, and stated
that the buyer could not enter into the PPA unless it
represented ‘value for money’. This meant that the
project would deliver an acceptable outcome to
both Eskom and the government (on behalf of
South African electricity users). Numerous factors
were taken into account, including the bidder’s
price proposal, ED commitments, the project’s cal-
culated IRR and foreign exchange risk borne by the
government. Lastly, if the evaluators considered the
success payments to developers to be unjustifiable
relative to the total project cost, the bidder could fail
this criterion. 
Returning compliant bidders
While various amendments to the RFP documenta-
tion had been made as the rounds progress, the BW
4 RFP introduced some noteworthy concessions
(some of which have already been highlighted
above) in an attempt to reduce the noted time and
cost burden for bidders (Papapetrou, 2014). Key to
this was the introduction of the ‘returning compliant
bidder’ concept, which addresses those bidders
who are re-submitting bids that were compliant in
earlier bid rounds, but unsuccessful in the second
stage evaluation. From BW 4 they were exempt
from adhering to certain qualification criteria (relat-
ing to land acquisition and use, as well as environ-
mental consents), provided that the new bid project
was located on the same site as previously. 
3.3. Evaluation criteria 
3.3.1. Price scoring
For each compliant bid, an equivalent annual tariff
(EAT) was calculated in respect of the bid tariff pro-
vided. This was used to determine the compliant
bidder’s price score out of a maximum of 70 points,
when compared to the lowest EAT offered for the
same technology in this BW. It is important to note
that this price score is a relative metric, hence the
second stage being a ‘comparative evaluation’. 
3.3.2. Economic development criteria and scoring
The ED criteria carried a maximum of 30 points.
This 70:30 split between price and ED objectives
represented a significant shift from government’s
usual 90:10 split (towards price) as stipulated by the
Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act
(Eberhard et al., 2014), and was only made possi-
ble through an exemption. This significant empha-
sis on a wide range of non-price objectives in a RE
IPP competitive tender was also uncommon global-
ly and set the REIPPPP apart. There has been con-
troversy over perceived trade-offs between lowering
bid prices and meeting ED criteria, with some argu-
ing that the latter adds complexity and cost.
However, the underlying objective is to facilitate
socioeconomic development, meaning that it gar-
nered crucial political support for the REIPPPP
(Eberhard et al., 2014). The ED criteria were
grouped in seven non-price categories: job creation,
local content, ownership, management control,
preferential procurement, enterprise, and socio-eco-
nomic development. Each category and its weight-
ed contribution to the total ED score is shown in
Table 3. From a policy perspective, the government
attached greater weightings to priority objectives,
such as job creation and local content (together
accounting for 50% of the ED score). The element
weightings remained unchanged from BW1 to 4. 
The REIPPPP indicated ‘thresholds’ and ‘tar-
gets’ per element and RET. Target outcomes were
provided for all categories to encourage bidder
commitment, but minimum threshold requirements
were only prescribed for job creation, local content,
ownership, and socio-economic development. As
discussed in Section 3.2.6., these thresholds had to
be met for the bid to pass the qualification criteria.
No thresholds were prescribed for management
control, preferential procurement and enterprise
development and they were therefore voluntary
10 This again relates to government efforts to redress
the inequalities that arose under apartheid. South
African entities are awarded BEE certificates, from
Level 1 (highest rank) to 8 (lowest), depending on
their contribution towards the integration of black
people into the economy (BEESA Group, 2016).
The REIPPPP would therefore only consider entities
that show a strong commitment to BEE principles. 
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commitments.11 Bidders were required to complete
and submit an ‘economic development information
sheet’ in the bid response, which automatically gen-
erated an economic development scorecard. The
pledged commitments in this scorecard were incor-
porated into the IA so that Preferred Bidders were
contractually bound to meet these obligations. 
The IA stipulated that IPPs were obliged to
report on these obligations to the DOE quarterly
and had to be able to provide proof. The first quar-
ter of monitoring began at financial close. There
were penalties and rewards based on quarterly per-
formance, with underperformance drawing termi-
nation points which could accumulate to the point
where the DOE is entitled to terminate the contract
(Eberhard et al., 2014). By imposing these penal-
ties, the DOE has ensured that bidders show an
ongoing commitment to the ED objectives rather
than falsifying pledges to win bids. It has been very
effective – to date no awarded projects have accu-
mulated enough ED penalty points to require con-
tract termination. 
3.3.3 Overall scoring
The bidder’s scores in respect of its ED criteria and
price were added together for a final combined
score out of 100. All bid projects per RET were then
ranked and those highest ranked were appointed as
preferred bidders, giving consideration to the maxi-
mum MW available for this technology.
3.4 Outcomes of the REIPPPP (as at BW 4)
Table 4 summarises the general outcomes of the
REIPPPP to date.
11 It is important to state clearly that the voluntary
nature of these commitments does not mean that
they did not count towards the evaluation score;
they were not, however, seen as qualifying criteria. 
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Table 3: Elements of the economic development criteria (as at BW 4) (DOE, 2014).




Job creation (25%) RSA-based employees who are citizens 50 80
RSA-based employees who are black people 30 50
Skilled employees who are black people 18 30
RSA-based employees who are citizens and from
local communities
12 20
RSA-based citizens employees per MW of contracted
capacity
N/A N/A
Local content (25%) Value of local content spending 40–45a 65
Ownership (15%) Shareholding by black people in the seller 12 30
Shareholding by local communities in the seller 2.5 5
Shareholding by black people in the construction
contractor
8 20
Shareholding by black people in the operations
contractor
8 20
Management control (5%) Black people in top management - 40
Preferential procurement
(10%)
BBBEE procurementb - 60
QSE & SME procurement b - 10
Women-owned vendor procurement b - 5
Enterprise development
(5%)
Enterprise development contributions c - 0.6
Adjusted enterprise development contributions c - 0.6
Socio-economic
development (15%)
Socio-economic development contributions c 1 1.5
Adjusted socio-economic development contributionsc 1 1.5
a. Depending on technology. 45% for solar PV, 40% for all other technologies.
b. As percentage of total procurement spend.
c. As a percentage of revenue.
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Table 4: REIPPPP capacity, tariff and investment outcomes per technology and bid window (Authors’
calculations from the DOE IPP office project data; Eberhard et al, 2014).
Wind PV CSP Biomass Biogas Landfill Hydro Total
BW 1
Capacity offered (MW) 1 850 1 450 200 13 13 25 75 3 626
Capacity awarded (MW) 649 627 150 0 0 0 0 1 425
Projects awarded 8 18 2 0 0 0 0 28
Average tariff (ZAR c/kWh) 114 276 269 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Average tariff (USD c/kWh) ZAR8/$ 14 35 34 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A  
Total investment (ZAR m) 13 876 23 559 11 891 0 0 0 0 49 326
Total investment (USD m) ZAR8/$ 1 734 2 945 1 486 0 0 0 0 6 166
BW 2
Capacity offered (MW) 650 450 50 13 13 25 75 1 276
Capacity awarded (MW) 559 417 50 0 0 0 14 1 040
Projects awarded 7 9 1 0 0 0 2 19
Average tariff (ZAR c/kWh) 90 165 251 N/A N/A N/A 103 N/A
Average tariff (USD c/kWh) ZAR7.94/$ 11 21 32 N/A N/A N/A 13 N/A
Total investment (ZAR m) 13 783 13 841 5 097 0 0 0 722 33 442
Total investment (USD m) ZAR7.94/$ 1 736 1 743 642 0 0 0 91 4 212
BW 3
Capacity offered (MW) 654 401 200 60 12 25 121 1 473
Capacity awarded (MW) 787 435 200 17 0 18 0 1 457
Projects awarded 7 6 2 1 0 1 0 17
Average tariff (ZAR c/kWh) 74 99 164 140 N/A 94 N/A N/A
Average tariff (USD c/kWh) ZAR9.86/$ 8 10 17 14 N/A 10 N/A N/A
Total investment (ZAR m) 16 969 8145 17 949 1062 0 288 0 44 412
Total investment (USD m) ZAR9.86/$ 1721 826 1 820 108 0 29 0 4 504
BW 3.5
Capacity offered (MW) 200 200
Capacity awarded (MW) 200 200
Projects awarded 2 2
Average tariff (ZAR c/kWh) 153 153
Average tariff (USD c/kWh) ZAR10.52/$ 15 15
Total investment (ZAR m) 18 319 18 319
Total investment (USD m) ZAR10.52/$ 1 741 1 741
BW 4 (a)
Capacity offered (MW) 590 400 0 40 0 15 60 1 105
Capacity awarded (MW) 676 415 0 25 0 0 5 1 121
Projects awarded 5 6 0 1 0 0 1 13
Average tariff (ZAR c/kWh) 62 79 N/A 145 N/A N/A 112 N/A
Average tariff (USD c/kWh) ZAR12/$ 5 7 N/A 12 N/A N/A 9 N/A
Total investment (ZAR m) 13 466 8 504 0 1195 0 0 245 23 411
Total investment (USD m) ZAR12/$ 1 122 709 0 100 0 0 20 1 951
BW 4 (b)
Capacity offered (MW)
Capacity awarded (MW) 686 398 0 0 0 0 0 1 084
Projects awarded 7 6 0 0 0 0 0 13
Average tariff (ZAR c/kWh) 72 85 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Average tariff (USD c/kWh) ZAR12.5/$ 6 7 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Total investment (ZAR m) 15 330 8 363 0 0 0 0 0 23 693
Total investment (USD m) ZAR12.5/$ 1 226 669 0 0 0 0 0 1 895
TOTALS
Capacity offered (MW) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Capacity awarded (MW) 3 357 2 292 600 42 0 18 19 6 328
Projects awarded 34 45 7 2 0 1 3 92
Total investment (ZAR m) 73 423 62 411 53 256 2 257 0 288 968 192 603
Total investment (USD m) 7 540 6 892 5 690 207 0 29 111 20 470
3.4.1. Capacity outcomes
The most capacity offered and bid under the
REIPPPP was for the two lowest cost technologies,
wind and solar PV. Figure 1 illustrates the RET com-
position of the 6 328 MW procured to date.
Testimony to the quality of the REIPPPP is that no
projects have yet failed to reach financial close
(although at the time of writing BW4 projects were
still in the process of obtaining approvals and plan-
ning permissions). 
Figure 1: Total MW procured per technology
(BW 1 to 4, including CSP-only round).
3.4.2. Energy price outcomes
The most striking outcome has been the decline in
average energy prices over time for all technologies
except small hydro, as shown in Table 4. This has
resulted in a declining weighted average energy tar-
iff (Figure 2) and is an important step in achieving
grid parity, whereby the prices of newer (renewable)
energy sources are equivalent to conventional (fos-
sil fuel) sources. 
In BW 1 the bid tariffs were fairly close to the
prescribed caps and less capacity was bid for than
was made available for tender. It is believed that
bidders charged a premium because they knew that
competition was likely to be limited as a result of
tight deadlines (not all potential bidders would have
located sites, undertaken resource measurements or
obtained the necessary permits), and significant
capacity was on offer. The sizable average tariff
decline from BW 1 to 2, despite the price caps
remaining unchanged, clearly illustrates the benefit
of offering less capacity for tender and increasing
competition. As the primary technology (wind and
solar PV) caps were adjusted downwards in BW 3
the bid tariffs also declined significantly, and further
reductions were seen in BW 4 when their price caps
were removed entirely. Due to the success of the
bids received in BW 4, two batches of preferred bid-
ders were announced. BW 4(a) awarded the 13
highest-ranked bid responses received, while BW
4(b) selected bids that had ranked 14th to 26th.
Because the BW 4(b) projects were lower-ranked
bids with higher tariffs, BW 4(b) has been included
before BW 4(a) in Figure 2 to best represent the
downward trend in tariffs. 
Onshore wind is the cost leader of the RETs and
has consistently been the cheapest source across
rounds. In BW 4(a), the most competitively priced
round to date, the average tariff for awarded wind
projects was ZARc 62/ kWh (USDc 5.2/ kWh), with
the cheapest awarded wind project submitting a bid
tariff of only ZARc 56/ kWh (USDc 4.7/ kWh).
However, the largest price drops over the course of
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Figure 2: Weighted average bid tariff (across all selected projects) per bid window (Authors’
calculations from DOE IPP office data; Eberhard et al, 2014).
Note: BW 3.5 excluded from this illustration.
Weighting by share of contracted capacity for that round.
the REIPPPP have been noted for solar PV, which
decreased by approximately two-thirds from BW 1
to 3, and by 25% from BW 3 to 4. In BW 4(a) the
lowest tariff for an awarded solar PV project was
ZARc 77/ kWh (USDc 6.4/ kWh), with a similar
average PV tariff at ZARc 79/ kWh (USDc 6.6/
kWh).
There have been several contributors to the
downward trend in prices. Lower capacity alloca-
tions per round and investor confidence, amongst
other factors, have stimulated competition. Input
costs have also declined, mainly on the back of
falling international prices for RE equipment (due to
excess supply).12
3.4.3. Investment outcomes
Of the 92 preferred bidders to date, 79 opted to
finance their projects using a combination of project
finance and equity, while the remaining 13 used
corporate finance only. As a result external debt
(project financing) accounts for a significant ZAR
125.6 billion (65%) of the ZAR 193 billion total
funding raised, while equity and corporate finance
account for the remaining 23% and 12%, respec-
tively. The average project financed project was
highly geared. Most of the awarded projects indicat-
ed a 70–80% debt versus 20–30% equity split. 
3.4.4. Key sponsors (equity providers)
The REIPPPP has succeeded in generating interest
from local, regional and international project devel-
opers and sponsors. A large number of participants
in different BWs made repeat contributions through
equity, debt or both, highlighting investor confi-
dence in the process and its outcomes. The large
permitted foreign shareholding of up to 60%
attracted sustained interest from international com-
panies looking for diversification benefits and high-
er return potential than developed countries. Enel,
the Italian utility, was particularly prominent, with
equity holdings in 11 awarded projects since BW 3.
A number of internationally backed IPPs also estab-
lished local offices, such as Biotherm, Scatec Solar,
Globeleq and Building Energy. Some South African
IPPs complained that the presence of these interna-
tionally backed companies limited their ability to
participate, with stringent RFP and lender require-
ments ‘forcing’ local developers to on-sell projects
or partner with the multinationals. On the other
hand, these partnerships seem to have been very
successful and several recurring local-foreign equity
partnerships emerged. South African companies
and financial institutions were still successful in
building a portfolio of projects. For example, Old
Mutual, a South African financial services group,
owns equity in17 projects. Local participation has
been promoted by the ED thresholds: 40% project
company ownership by South African citizens, 12%
ownership by black individuals and 2.5% owner-
ship by the local community. 
3.4.5. Key external debt providers
Over 20 different debt providers participated in
financing projects awarded under the REIPPPP. In
contrast to equity investment, which was a mixture
of foreign and local sponsors, repeat debt was
mainly provided by local entities (Figure 3).The five
largest local banks (ABSA, Nedbank, RMB,
12 This would have been partly offset by the significant
rand depreciation over the past few years, increasing
equipment import costs.
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Figure 3: Total funding per lender category (ZAR million) and percentage contribution to total debt
funding – BWs 1 to 4 (Authors’ calculations from DOE IPP Office project data). This figure presents
what was originally included in bids, and does not represent current hold positions or what was
concluded at financial close.
Standard Bank and Investec) contributed 68% of
the external debt to date. The DBSA and Industrial
Development Corporation, both South African
development finance institutions, were also instru-
mental in the REIPPPP’s success, providing 13% of
the debt. The remainder has been provided by
other development finance institutions, export cred-
it agencies and local insurance or asset manage-
ment companies. 
Several factors may have contributed to local
dominance, such as low currency exposure (inter-
national lenders may be reluctant to lend to projects
that earn revenue in ZAR) and an awareness of
local issues. The South African banking sector is
also one of the most sophisticated in the world,
which was hugely beneficial to the REIPPPP. The
five largest local banks (and the DBSA) have partic-
ipated in every BW, including the CSP-only round,
showing their commitment to the programme. 
3.4.6. Economic development outcomes
In terms of the job creation criterion, it is projected
that 109 444 jobs will be created for local citizens
based on the bid data submitted over all BWs
(including the dedicated CSP round), where a ‘job’
is defined as a job-year. Of this, a substantial
84 564 job-years will be awarded to black citizens
and 57 690 job years to the local community sur-
rounding the project site. 
The local content criterion requires a certain per-
centage of total project value to be spent in South
Africa (DOE, 2011). The definition of what consti-
tutes local content has been refined, and required
disclosures increased, over the BWs. Table 5com-
pares the average local content outcomes to their
respective targets and thresholds per technology.
With the notable exception of solar PV, the table
suggests that most RETs experienced constraints in
achieving higher local content expenditure, with the
more recent average local content commitments sit-
ting much closer to the threshold than target. 
The socioeconomic development (SED) criteri-
on aims to direct funding to ensure that IPP projects
have a positive socio-economic impact (i.e. fund
improvements in healthcare, infrastructure and edu-
cation). There is particular emphasis on achieving
this in the communities where the projects are locat-
ed, defined as the ‘recognition for localness’, for
evaluation. The project’s total SED contributions
were calculated as a percentage of project revenue
and had to meet or exceed a threshold. Bidders
seem to have embraced this requirement – in total
the REIPPPP has dedicated a remarkable ZAR 19
billion to SED initiatives across South Africa.
4. Conclusion
When it comes to procuring renewable energy gen-
eration from IPPs, the South African REIPPPP sup-
ports growing international evidence that competi-
tive tenders achieve superior results to other policy
instruments. As per IRENA and CEM (2015), the
success of a tender will depend on whether it has
been well designed to achieve two key goals:
increased competition amongst bidders to reduce
price outcomes and secondly, participation only by
bidders that have the capacity to implement their
projects at the contracted bid tariff within the given
timeframe. With these objectives in mind, the
REIPPPP offers several key lessons for policymak-
ers in other developing countries.
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